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Trade-off vs. Pecking order: 
Um ciclo de vida de decisões de financiamento 
Resumo 
 
 
Com o auxilio das teorias do trade-off e do pecking order, esta dissertação procura estudar se, as 
decisões de financiamento de empresas, durante o periodo de 1996 até 2007, são consistentes com a 
ideia de um ciclo de vida de decisões de financiamento. A amostra é constituida por 56420 
observações, oriundas de 48 países diferentes. 
 
Os resultados mostram que ambas as teorias apresentam limitações, quer de cariz teórico quer 
empírico. No entanto, de forma geral, a teoria do trade-off domina a teoria do pecking order, 
especialmente para empresas em crescimento. Por sua vez, embora o desempenho da teoria do 
pecking order não se destaque em qualquer uma das fases do ciclo de vida organizacional, este tende 
a melhorar ligeiramente em fases de maturidade. De facto, testes adicionais revelam que o 
desempenho da teoria do pecking order é mais severamente condicionado por empresas de diferentes 
tamanhos e com diferentes quantidades de ativos tangíveis. 
 
Conciliando toda a evidencia encontrada, verificamos que a existência de um ciclo de vida de decisões 
de financiamento não é, de todo, absurda. Empresas em fase de crescimento demonstram seguir um 
padrão de financiamento distinto do de empresas mais maduras, onde a escolha de capital próprio 
das primeiras, contrasta fortemente com a escolha de recursos internos e dívida das segundas, como 
fontes de financiamento. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: trade-off, pecking order, estrutura de capital, alavancagem, dívida, capital próprio, ciclo 
de vida, maturidade, crescimento, estagnação 
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Trade-off vs. Pecking order:  
A life cycle of financing decisions 
Abstract 
 
 
Assisted by the trade-off and pecking order theories, this dissertation, attempts to assess whether the 
financing decisions of firms, during the period from 1996 to 2007, are consistent with a life cycle of 
financing decisions. The sample comprises 56,420 firm observations from 48 different countries. 
 
Results show that both theories have weaknesses, either from theoretical or empirical nature. 
Nevertheless, in general, the trade-off dominates the pecking order, especially when growth firms are 
considered. In turn, while the pecking order performance does not stand out in any stage of the 
organizational life cycle, it tends to improve, slightly, in later stages of maturity. In fact, additional tests 
indicate that the performance of the pecking order is most severely constrained when firms are proxied 
by size and tangibility. 
 
Piecing together all the evidence, we find the existence of a life cycle of financing decisions, anything 
but absurd. Firms in growth stages, exhibit a financing pattern distinct to that of mature firms, where 
the choice for equity of the first, strongly contrasts with the choice for internal resources and debt of 
the second, as financing choices.  
 
 
Keywords:   trade-off, pecking order, capital structure, leverage, debt, equity, life cycle, maturity, 
growth, stagnancy 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Agradecimentos ..................................................................................................................................... iii 
Resumo .................................................................................................................................................. iv 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... v 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................... vi 
Table of Figures ..................................................................................................................................... vii 
Table of Tables ...................................................................................................................................... vii 
1 - Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
2 - Previous Research ............................................................................................................................ 11 
2.1 - Trade-off Theory ........................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2 - Pecking Order Theory ................................................................................................................... 13 
2.3 – Organizational Life Cycle Hypothesis ............................................................................................. 15 
3- Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 18 
3.1 - Trade-Off Model ............................................................................................................................ 18 
3.2 - Pecking Order Model .................................................................................................................... 20 
3.3 – Life Cycle Classification System .................................................................................................... 22 
4 - Sample and Data .............................................................................................................................. 26 
4.1 - Characteristics of Samples ............................................................................................................ 27 
5 - Results .............................................................................................................................................. 30 
5.1 - Trade-off Theory ........................................................................................................................... 30 
5.2 - Pecking Order Theory ................................................................................................................... 33 
6 - Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 37 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 39 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................................................ 63 
List of Variables  ........................................................................................................................... 63 
 
  
vii 
 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1- Diagram of the samples. .................................................................................................... 44 
 
 Table of Tables 
 
Table 1 - Consitution of the samples by countries (balanced samples)............................................................. 45 
Table 2 - Consitution of the samples by countries (unbalanced samples) ......................................................... 45 
Table 3 - Consitution of the samples by industries (balanced and unbalanced samples) .................................. 46 
Table 4 - Consitution of the subsamples by industries (unbalanced samples) .................................................. 47 
Table 5 - Summary statistics .......................................................................................................................... 48 
Table 6 - Variables used for the classification in different stages of maturity .................................................... 49 
Table 7 - Compound scores and stage attribution ........................................................................................... 49 
Table 8 - Trade-off OLS regressions (full balanced and unbalanced samples) ................................................... 50 
Table 9 - Trade-off OLS regressions (subsamples) ........................................................................................... 51 
Table 10 - Trade-off OLS regressions with control variables (subsamples) ........................................................ 52 
Table 11 - Leverage OLS regressions .............................................................................................................. 53 
Table 12 - Correlation between the leverage variables ..................................................................................... 54 
Table 13 - Leverage OLS Re, Fe and 2SLS regressions (full unbalanced samples) ........................................... 55 
Table 14 - Leverage 2SLS regressions (subsamples) ....................................................................................... 56 
Table 15 - Pecking order OLS regressions (full balanced and unbalanced samples) ......................................... 57 
Table 16 - Pecking order OLS regression (dissociated deficit) .......................................................................... 58 
Table 17 - Pecking order OLS regression continued (full balanced and unbalanced samples) ........................... 59 
Table 18 - Pecking order OLS regressions (subsamples) ................................................................................. 60 
Table 19 - Pecking order OLS regressions with control variables (subsamples) ................................................ 61 
Table 20 - Pecking order OLS regressions ( classification by size and tangibility).............................................. 62 
8 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
Raising funds is a vital operation for any firm. Fortunately, when a firm seeks to raise capital, there is a 
vast collection of financing instruments at managers’ disposal. Retained earnings may not always be 
available or enough, but debt and equity, are both feasible alternatives for the same purpose. In the 
end, the real mystery, boils down to which financing strategies are adopted by firms and why. 
 
Regrettably, many researchers and studies after the puzzle of corporation’s capital structure was first 
approached half a century ago by Modigliani & Miller (1958), the financial community is still clearly 
divided about which forces actually drive firms to select one funding source over another. Although 
many competing theories were developed over the last fifty years, none seems to tell the whole story 
yet, and some authors even argue that “there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no 
reason to expect one. There are several useful conditional theories, however.” Myers (2001, p. 81), 
“Thus it is probably time to stop running empirical horse races between them as stand-alone stories for 
capital structure.” Fama & French (2005, p. 580–581). 
 
Despite the lack of consensus, among these theories, two opposing mainstreams appear to dominate 
the subject of capital structure: trade-off and pecking order theories. While the first prophesies that 
firms pursuit an optimum capital structure, the second, conceptualizes a hierarchical structure of 
financing sources. Another underlying cause of their antagonism lays on how both relate several 
determinants, including investment opportunities and profitability, with leverage. Where the trade-off 
theory conjectures that leverage is negatively related to growth1 and positively related to profitability2, 
the pecking order anticipates an inverse relation3. 
 
Fama and French (2005) believe that “profitability and growth characteristics of firms are central in 
evaluating their financing decisions.” Curiously, growth and profitability can also be traced back to 
specific organizational life cycle stages.  
                                                          
1
 The existence of risky debt can induce managers to give up on future positive NPV projects, leading to a suboptimal investment policy (Myers, 1977). For 
this reason, growth firms are expected to use it sparingly. 
2
 Debt can be used to shield the taxable income (Modigliani & Miller, 1963) as well as control free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). 
3
 Since growth firms are likely to lack sufficient internal resources to finance their NPV opportunities, debt, will usually be the next best choice. Likewise, 
increased profitability is a synonym for auto-sufficiency. (Myers, 1984) 
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According to Mueller’s (1972) hypothesis, at early stages, agency problems are nearly nonexistent or 
negligible since, at this point, managers still own a significant portion of stock and as such, 
entrepreneurs and stockholders’ interests are conveniently aligned. Additionally, the existence of many 
investment opportunities that fuel a profit-oriented growth, together with the fact that insufficient 
internal funds compels firms to resort to external financing, receiving a heightened scrutiny, cements 
an harmonious relation between managers and stockholders.  
 
Later as firms evolve and competition interferes, managers and stockholders grow apart, to a certain 
extent, as a result of the ownership dilution that managers undergo, in order to raise capital at previous 
stages. Furthermore, growth is threatened, and the absence of positive NPV projects, generates a 
surplus of unused funds, accrued from current activities. Hence, when a firm reaches maturity, 
dividends4 will often be considered by managers, as the next best alternative to reinvestment. 
 
Eventually, once the initial opportunities fade completely, a stockholder-welfare maximizer manager will 
either rebuy the outstanding stocks or liquidate the remaining assets and distribute the earnings as a 
last stream of dividends, to stockholders. 
 
In light of the exposed, could there be a link between the organizational life cycle hypothesis and the 
capital structure theories? To the best of our knowledge, no relevant past literature explicitly answers 
this question. Mueller (1972), describes each life stage as a precise set of key characteristics5 that 
evolve dynamically during a firm’s existence however, most traditional studies, tend to focus on 
individual aspects of firms, as if they occurred independently one of another. 
 
We argue that, the failure to acknowledge all the changes that firms endure at each stage, could lead to 
a dubious assessment of stages and inadequate extrapolations, regarding a firm’s life cycle. Therefore, 
only with a model that recognizes and incorporates all the relevant changes, simultaneously, are we 
able to accurately describe each stage of firm development and answer whether a life cycle of financing 
choices really exists. 
 
                                                          
4
 Other forms of payout may be considered by managers; i.e., shares repurchase (Grullon & Michaely, 2002). 
5
 Investment opportunities, profitability and dividend policy are some of the most obvious changes that a firm endures as it evolves from younger to more 
mature stages. 
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To bridge the gap in literature between the organizational life cycle hypothesis and the modern capital 
structure theories, this study intends to empirically test how the trade-off and pecking order theories 
perform with samples in different stages of maturity and hopefully, further enlighten our perception 
about the capital structure of firms. 
 
Resting on a multivariate stage classification system, previously used by Anthony & Ramesh (1992), we 
find that, on a set of international broad samples, the pecking order theory is consistently outperformed 
by the trade-off model in every life cycle stage. Additionally, while the trade-off performance degrades 
when exposed to samples of firms in later stages of maturity, the pecking order displays a slight 
improvement. Complementary tests also show that the pecking order performance is highly related 
with other variables like tangibility and size. Altogether, we interpret the evidence as consistent with a 
life cycle of financing choices, considering that growth and mature firms follow different financing 
patterns. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in the next chapter we present the relevant literature. In 
chapter 3, we detail the methodology adopted, followed by the data description in section 4. In chapter 
5, we examine the results and in section 6 we conclude our findings. 
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2 - Previous Research 
 
What is the ‘cost of capital’ to a firm in a world in which funds are used to acquire assets whose 
yields are uncertain; and in which capital can be obtained by many different media, ranging from 
pure debt instruments, representing money-fixed claims, to pure equity issues, giving holders 
only the right to a pro-rata share in the uncertain venture? (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, p. 1) 
 
With the previous question in mind, Modigliani & Miller (1958), documented the irrelevance theory of 
capital structure, according to which, firms’ value is not a function of its financial decisions. In other 
words, backed by the idea that capital markets are perfect, under the deliberately utopic world 
proposed by Modigliani & Miller (1958), whether a firm decides to finance its assets by issuing pure 
debt, equity, or any mix of debt-equity, the outcome is the same. 
 
Clearly, the assumptions were too restrictive to mirror a credible reality. However, even though to that 
extent, the original work could be considered somewhat limited, it rapidly raised the attention of several 
authors, propelling a series of studies that actively corner stoned the birth of the modern capital 
theories. Soon, the irrelevance theory became relevant.  
 
 
2.1 - Trade-off Theory 
 
The static trade-off theory saw light as many of the former assumption were dropped in favor of 
realism. This time, under the idea that markets are efficient but not perfect, different authors embraced 
a new reality that acknowledged the existence of taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs. Modigliani & 
Miller (1963) for one, recognize the positive role of tax shields on leverage while at the same time, alert 
for the fact that using debt may not always be optimal, due to certain limitations and costs associated 
with this financial choice. In turn, Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), discuss potential 
conflicts of interests between managers and bondholders (shareholders), as a direct result from 
overusing (neglecting) leverage. While debt can be considered an effective instrument to control 
financial slack6 or even rebalance the interests of managers and stockholders through repurchase of 
                                                          
6
 A commitment to debt holders, implies the payment of interest with free cash flows that otherwise could be misused at the discretionary will of the 
manager; i.e., empire building.  
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stock, in excess, can lead to problems of asset substitution7. Also, according to Myers (1977), firms 
should issue debt conservatively, as the accumulation of risky debt, could compromise valuable future 
investment opportunities. 
 
In the current context, the pattern encoded in the trade-off theory becomes evident. Firms ought to 
track a delicate equilibrium – target capital structure – by carefully weighting the costs8 and benefits9 of 
resorting to debt, in view to maximize its value. This constitutes the main precept of the classic, static 
trade-off theory10. 
 
While the empirical relevance of this theory is far from consensual, many authors present evidence 
consistent with this view. For instance, Taggart (1977) and Marsh (1982), claim that firms’ financial 
decisions seem to be consistent with the pursuit of certain, both long-term and short-term, debt ratios. 
Bradley et al. (1984) account for similar leverage ratios between companies in the same sector which, 
together with the strong inverse relation between the volatility of firms’ earnings and leverage, suggests 
the existence of an optimal capital structure. MacKie-Mason (1990), Givoly, Hayn, Ofer, & Sarig (1992) 
and Trezevant(1992) not only positively relate taxation rate with leverage but also find that firms verging 
tax exhaustion11 are more likely to overlook debt as a financial choice. Soku (2008) concurs, stating that 
not only the capital structure behavior is remarkably captured by the target adjustment model as the 
most noticeable adjustments occur when “a firm faces a financial surplus with above-target debt.” 
(Soku, 2008, p.3088). 
 
Another line of studies, eagerly express some troubling concerns that distrusts the theory. Some are 
more debatable, as Hovakimian, Opler & Titman (2001) and Hovakimian, Hovakimian, & Tehranian 
(2004) who, besides expressing full support of the trade-off theory, also find that firms’ preference for 
internal resources and attempt to benefit from equity issues when shares are overpriced, unbalance 
their debt ratio relatively to their target. Similarly, Baker & Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004), also 
disclose a certain firms’ capital structure lethargy, regarding an often pronounced and long lasting 
variation in stock prices.  
                                                          
7
 Shareholders might feel tempted to incur in riskier activities at the expense of debt holders. Once debt is in place and since debt holders expect a fixed 
return, equity holders will get all the upside generated from undertaking riskier projects than initially foreseen, while bond holders bare all the risks. 
8
 I.e., Overleveraged firms will incur in increased financial distress - bankruptcy risk. 
9
 I.e., Interest payments reduce the taxable income -debt tax shield. 
10
 The trade-off theory also contemplates the dynamic version where a firm’s capital structure may not lay on a fixed target debt ratio, but within a range. 
11
 Those for which additional tax shields are unlikely to sort further beneficial effects. 
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Their conclusions however, are questioned by Leary & Roberts (2005), who interpret their results in 
light of adjustment costs and argue that firms do rebalance their capital structure, just not 
continuously. Further subduing this matter, Alti (2006) claims that these attempts of market timing 
may shake firms’ financial structure in the short run but, the effect doesn’t persist over the long run, 
and firms rapidly fall to previous target leverage ratios. In fact, Flannery & Rangan (2006) argue that 
firms do correct their deviations from the target, as much as 30% per year, when certain shocks shift 
their capital structure. Therefore, according to Lemmon, Roberts, & Zender (2008), firms tend to 
constrain their leverage to fairly “narrow bands”, especially using debt rather than equity, supporting a 
less strict form of yet trade-off theory. 
 
Other reports are more decisive and pose real inconsistencies, like Fama & French (2002) and Frank & 
Goyal (2003, 2009) who document a negative relation between leverage and profitability. An usual 
finding also accounted in Harris & Raviv (1991), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Johnson (1997),  that 
clearly cannot be explained by a theory, whose predictions are that firms who have more earnings to 
shield - profitable firms - should use debt more aggressively. 
 
Finally, there are also some findings, whose results cannot be, unequivocally, identified with any of the 
capital structure theories, including the trade-off, arguing that their “results do not provide support for 
an effect on debt ratios arising from non-debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value, or future growth”. 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988, p.17) 
The variety of evidence is such that, it was only a matter of time until alternative theories arouse. One 
of these alternatives is the pecking order theory. 
 
 
2.2 - Pecking Order Theory 
 
Opposing the trade-off, Myers & Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) reject the existence of an optimal 
capital structure altogether, and clarify how information asymmetry and the signaling theory mingle 
together to provide a more suitable explanation for the financial decision process.  
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Cogitating about the rationality of investors, one easily foresees that every security issued by a given 
firm is carefully evaluated by the market. A task that by no means is easy, considering that investors 
cannot, at least accurately, measure neither the value of the firm’s assets in place nor its investment 
opportunities. This causes an issue commonly known as information asymmetry. 
 
In a scenario such as this, investors can only conjecture about the true reasons behind a new issue of 
stock. Positive NPV projects would signal good news, but a sneak attempt to transfer value from newer 
to older investors, because the firm is currently overvalued by the market, would signal not so good 
news. 
 
Based on similar arguments, Myers & Majluf (1984), claim that the superior information detained by 
shareholder-welfare maximizer managers, will often trigger a pessimist feeling in new investors, who 
will punish new issues of stock with a downgrade of prices that should be as severe as the information 
advantage of managers over new investors12. In response, managers will often pursue the path of least 
resistance, avoiding undervalued securities and preserving current shareholder’s value, at the cost of 
positive NPV projects, if necessary. 
 
In light of this, Myers (1984) ends up wrapping that there is a pecking order according to which, 
managers will consume the financial instruments that entail the lowest costs first - retained earnings. If 
that source is unavailable or insufficient, they will exhaust debt before considering equity13. This stack of 
financing solutions, underpins the pecking order theory.  
 
Most evidence supporting this theory comes from all the shortcomings pointed out to earlier theories, 
as the trade-off, but not all. Complement literature includes, Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999), claiming 
that the pecking order provides a good fit for their restricted sample of mature companies which, 
seemingly, not only use debt to finance unexpected short run needs, but also anticipated deficits. Also, 
while they find that the trade-off performs well when tested alone, when together with the pecking 
order, its contribution to explain the paradigm of the financial behavior, is negligible at best. 
Additionally, Leary & Roberts (2005) found that firms with significant investment opportunities tend to 
                                                          
12
 This reasoning was later supported by Asquith & Mullins (1986), Masulis & Korwar (1986) and Mikkelson & Partch (1986). 
13
 Since debt claims over the firm’s assets and earnings come before equity, this should reduce significantly the problem of asymmetry. There might be, 
however, times when equity is preferred over debt, by more pessimistic managers (i.e., if a given firm already faces enough high financial distress). 
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rely more on external capital markets than firms with sufficient internal funds, clearly emphasizing the 
importance of information asymmetry costs in capital decisions.  
 
On the other side of the scale, Fama & French (2002), discuss that growth firms with low leverage 
ratios tend to issue substantial amounts of equity, which seems to challenge the pecking order. Results 
that are reiterated in Fama & French (2005), when they document the period from 1993 to 2002 as an 
epoch where the use of equity was quite recurrent. Furthermore, they advert that equity is not 
necessarily the last choice available to managers, advancing alternative solutions that could mitigate 
the gap of information asymmetry between agents and would allow the issue of equity with reduced 
costs. 
 
Other authors, including Frank & Goyal (2003), using a broader sample than Shyan-Sunder & Myers 
(1999), increased the sample’s exposure to smaller firms and found that, on average, internal 
resources do not suffice to cover investment needs, resulting in a rather meaningful use of external 
funding by firms, where debt does not overpower equity. An argument that Tsyplakov (2008) realigned 
with the pecking order theory, arguing that smaller firms may be a proxy for greater “investment 
frictions”. Sharing a similar reasoning, Lemmon & Zender (2010), explain how the concept of debt-
capacity can be articulated to validate these results under the pecking order framework. 
 
At the end of the day, despite the multitude of evidence provided, the discussion about the capital 
structure of firms does not seem to be any closer to settle than the day when it all began. Without 
certainties, all we’re really left with is the determination to continue debating until a more definite 
answer can be found. Therefore, we believe it’s time to reconcile the modern capital structure theories 
with an equally old, yet overlooked topic – the organizational life cycle hypothesis. 
 
 
2.3 – Organizational Life Cycle Hypothesis 
 
One year after Modigliani & Miller (1958) launched the capital structure discussion, Haire (1959) 
pioneered another gem that has persisted to modern times. Looking past the inert concrete walls of 
firms, Haire (1959) observed a nonlinear development process similar to those of living organisms 
16 
 
which, Gardner (1965) metaphorizes, quite interestingly, in his work when he describes that “like 
people and plants, organizations have a life cycle. They have a green and supple youth, a time of 
flourishing strength, and a gnarled old age”. (Gardner, 1965, p.16) A rather unusual comparison, that 
thrived under the name of organizational life cycle theory. 
 
Building on that concept, many life cycle models have followed, each, speculating about a possible 
path of firm development, and feeding a dispute about an unknown number of stages. Consequently, 
time has witnessed definitions with three (Mueller, 1972), four (Quinn & Cameron, 1983), five (Greiner, 
1972; Miller & Friesen, 1984) and even ten (Adizes, 1990) stages. 
 
Regardless of the disaggregation level assumed, the protruding fact is that, most scholars share the 
consensual agreement that firms are not immutable and, overtime, inevitably experience a common 
array of challenges and opportunities that can be synthesized into a well-defined set of unique stages. 
 
Despite the pertinence of this view, only recently, has the organizational life cycle theory stirred some 
interest in the field of corporate finance. Authors like, Fama & French (2001), Grullon et al. (2002) and 
DeAngelo & DeAngelo (2006), all, conducting studies on firms’ propensity to pay dividends, seem to 
have stumbled on patterns of dividends that resemble a financial life cycle. According to Fama & 
French (2001) results, large and profitable firms are classified as the main dividend-payers while small 
and high growth firms fill the prerequisites for firms that lack positive payouts. Grullon et al. (2002), 
explain similar findings through what they call “the maturity hypothesis”, where the propensity to pay 
dividends increases with the maturity of firms, converging with DeAngelo & DeAngelo (2006) 
predictions. 
 
Not long after, perhaps enthused by the possibility, DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz (2006), revive the 
organizational life cycle hypothesis and explicitly pursue the idea of a life cycle theory of dividends, 
successfully relating the propensity to pay dividends with the earned/ contributed capital mix, which 
they use as a proxy for different life cycle stages. They claim that, the ability to capture information 
about the financial autonomy of firms, confers the retained earnings ratio an outstanding capability to 
distinguish between firms in the capital infusion (low RE/TE) and the distribution (high RE/TE) stages. 
Additionally, DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz (2006, p.228), stress that “the source of the cash impacts 
the dividend decision” which, immediately echoes back to the capital structure discussion and exalts 
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the plausibility of a connection between the modern capital structure theories and the organizational life 
cycle hypothesis. 
 
To our surprise however, the literature conciliating both theories, is less than abundant, not to say, 
scarce. The most relevant, and probably single, explicit attempt to explore this idea, dates back to 
Berger & Udell (1998), whose work consisted in mere theoretical assertions pieced together from 
several strands of past, existing research. Their conclusions are that, small and large firms make use of 
different financing mechanisms that mirror the degree of information asymmetry embodied in each 
stage. Thus, small young firms, which are especially opaque, tend to gather most of their resources 
from insiders, as private equity and debt, rather than external public markets. As a result, they contend 
that different financing strategies may be optimal at different points in a life cycle that, they measure by 
size and age, respectively. 
 
Since no further, known, evidence was pursued regarding this subject, the present study seeks to 
complement this line of research and test whether the concept of a life cycle of financing decisions 
holds any empirical truth or consists instead, on just an interesting “wannabe” theory, that should be 
better left alone. To this end, during the next chapter we expose a comprehensive description of the 
methodologies used to accomplish the goal set. 
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3- Methodology 
 
Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999), devised two models to benchmark the performance of the trade-off and 
pecking order theories. These models involve concepts as deficit and the target leverage ratio that shall 
be explained in further detail next, since, these are the same tests that will be used throughout this 
study. Alongside with Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999) methodology and definitions we complement our 
work with alternatives proposed by Frank & Goyal (2003), Fama & French (2005) and Flannery & 
Rangan (2006), which should contribute to increase the robustness of this study.  
 
 
3.1 - Trade-Off Model 
 
According to the static trade-off theory, managers follow a predetermined proportion of debt – target 
debt ratio – and actively react to several events that shift their capital structure away from that target, 
by continuously adjusting their current leverage ratio. Thus, changes in the debt ratio must be 
explained by deviations from the target debt ratio. Econometrically, we can address the problem in a 
similar way to what Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999) did: 
 
*
1( )it TA it it itD a b D D e     ,  (1) 
Where, 
itD , is the debt ratio variation (long term debt, total debt), 
*
itD , is the target debt ratio that managers try to achieve, and 
*
1( )it itD D  , is the deviation from the target ratio. 
 
If the trade-off theory is confirmed then, in a frictionless world, we should have 1TAb  . In fact, that’s 
what the traditional story suggests us. Notwithstanding, a more plausible hypothesis is one that 
considers the existence of adjustment costs that induce some kind of lag to the correction process 
19 
 
(Myers, 1984). As such, we expect to find 0 1TAb  , meaning that 1) leverage is partially corrected 
towards the target and 2) there are significantly positive adjustment costs. 
 
One focus of concern worth mentioning, however, is the target debt ( *itD ). While an important piece in 
the trade-off model, the target debt is unobservable. This means that alternative proxies must be 
constructed, so that we are able to quantify it. Naturally, different specifications of this variable can lead 
to potentially different conclusions. As a result, we test the most common answers, which usually rely 
on historical debt ratios, either specific to each firm or to its industry. More specifically, we considered 
the following definitions for the target debt ratio: 
 Five years rolling debt ratio mean – calculated as the mean of the prior five, most recent, 
historical debt ratios, for a given firm year. 
 
 Industry debt ratio mean – calculated as the industry mean for both, firm year T and T-1 (with 
similar results); 
 
 Firm debt ratio mean – calculated as the mean for the full period by which a firm enters the 
sample; 
 
Despite logical, this model was also reported to be somewhat misleading by Sunder & Myers (1999) 
who, after conducting some robustness tests, warned about its lack of power to empirically validate the 
trade-off theory. To mitigate this problem, and increase the reliability of our results, we complement our 
trade-off tests with a second model proposed by Flannery & Rangan (2006), given by: 
 
, 1 ,*i t i tMLR X  , (2) 
Where, 
, 1*i tMLR  , is the firm’s target leverage ratio in t+1, 
X , is the vector of firm characteristics related to the costs and benefits of operating with various 
leverage ratios, and
 
 , is a coefficient vector 
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The method, aims to explore a different angle. Unlike the previous model, it acknowledges in advance 
that adjustment costs are a reality that inevitably renders the option to correct the deviations from the 
target, in each period, suboptimal. Thus, instead of testing how much firms correct their deviations 
from a target debt ratio, we’ll be looking at how fast it happens, if at all. According to Flannery & 
Rangan (2006), adjustment speed is as much an indication of the trade-off validity as the amount of 
the adjustment. In result of this, they postulate the following partial adjustment model:  
 
, 1 , , 1 , , 1( * )i t i t i t i t i tMLR MLR MLR MLR e      ,  (3) 
If firms follow the trade-off, they will take on different actions to correct, at least, part of the difference (
 ) between their current (MLRi,t) and desired (MLR*i,t+1) leverage ratios. 
Finally, combining the equations (2) and (3), we can test: 
 
, 1 , , , 1( ) (1 )i t i t i t i tMLR X MLR e       (4)
 
Lambda ( ) is assumed to be the same for every firm and can vary between 0 and 1. If  =1, 
expresses that firms adjust their leverage ratios completely and immediately. Any values lower than 1 
should help quantify the “speed” at which the partial adjustment is made at.  
 
 
3.2 - Pecking Order Model 
 
The pecking order theory emphasizes the role that information asymmetry plays concerning manager’s 
financial decisions. This logic implies that it will be in a firm’s best interest to use internal funds first, 
followed by debt and while equity should be avoided, it can become a choice, either when a firm 
struggles with duress or in case a pure debt strategy leads to an overleveraged condition. Shyan-Sunder 
& Myers (1999) captures that relationship in the following way: 
 
( )it Po it itD a b Def e    , (5) 
Where, 
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itD , is the variation of debt and 
itDef , is the firm’s deficit given by 
 
it t t t t tDef Div X W R C      (6) 
Where, 
tDiv , are the dividends paid, 
tX , are the capital expenditures, 
tW , is the net increase/ decrease in working capital, 
tR , is the current portion of long term debt at start of period, and 
tC , are the net operating cash flows 
 
The difference between a firm’s cash outflows and inflows generates a deficit that according to the 
pecking theory should be financed with debt. If that assumption holds, than the strong-form of the 
pecking order requires a βpo= 1 and α = 0. While the pecking order theory is very strict when stating 
that managers will always go with the financial source that bares the lowest cost for a given firm, it 
does leave room to imagine that under the right circumstances, equity could precede debt (discussed 
above). As a direct consequence of this, a weaker-form of the same theory, plausibly considers equity 
issues that would result in lower levels of issued debt, given by a βpo< 1 but, always close to the unit. 
 
Correctly identifying all the variables that compose the deficit however, can prove to be challenging. In 
face of this, and following a similar reasoning, Frank & Goyal (2003) advance the following accounting 
cashflow identity: 
 
 it t t t t t t tDef Div X W R C D E         (7) 
Where, 
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tD , is the net long term debt issued, and 
tE , is the net equity issued (difference between equity issued and redeemed). 
By definition, the deficit has to be financed by external funds, which means using any mix of debt/ 
equity. Thus, the sum of debt and equity issued should match the deficit. Nonetheless, Fama & French 
(2005) identify a caveat in this approach. They argue that it fails to accurately measure equity issues 
that are commonly left out of cashflow statements namely, during mergers and to employees. 
Therefore, a better approach would be as follows: 
 
it it it it itDef A RE L SB       (8) 
Where, 
itA , is the variation in total assets, 
itRE , is the variation in retained earnings. 
itL , is the variation in long term debt 
it it itSB SE RE     (9) 
 
Where,  
itSE , is the net equity issued 
itRE , is the change in retained earnings  
 
In this manner, according to Fama & French (2005) we achieve a superior measure of outside equity 
(∆SBit) that together with the change in long term debt should provide a more accurate value for the 
deficit. 
 
 
3.3 – Life Cycle Classification System 
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From the start, the main purpose of this study has been to ascertain if there is any plausible link 
between the modern capital theories discussed throughout this paper, and the organizational life cycle 
hypothesis. Naturally, to investigate such subject, it’s important to devise a reasonable system to 
classify firms into different stages of maturity, namely, growth, maturity and stagnancy.  
Unfortunately, related literature doesn’t provide any suitable framework for the task at hand. In spite of 
this, widening the scope of research, lead to Anthony & Ramesh’s (1992) work about stock response to 
accounting performance measures where, kindly enough, they disclose a promising classification 
procedure. 
 
Rather than a single proxy approach, this is a multivariate method that contains variables, frequently 
documented in similar contexts, as age, capital expenditures, sales variation and dividends paid, all of 
which, fit perfectly into Mueller’s (1972) hypothesis, and where: 
 Age – in years. Since the database was missing the foundation date variable, age was 
estimated using 1) the incorporation date and 2) the date of entry in the database14. Both 
alternatives were used in the past, and not surprisingly, produced similar results. 
 
 Capital Expenditures – capital expenditures as a percentage of total value. Despite being 
initially considered, this variable was eventually dropped and not used during the classification 
stage, since it can bias the classification of growth firms. As explained in Anthony & Ramesh 
(1992), some sectors show higher levels of capital expenditures than others, and firms in 
those sectors aren’t necessarily in growth stages. 
 
 Sales variation – as percentage sales growth. 
 
 Dividends paid – common dividends as a percentage of net income before extraordinary items 
and preferred dividends. 
 
The logic behind each of these variables is very straightforward. Firms in growth stages should, on 
average, be younger, show higher sales growth and pay less, if any, dividends. Also, as they evolve, the 
relationships should reverse as shown in Table 6. 
                                                          
14
 Lemmon & Zender (2010) and Lemmon & Roberts(2010), use this approach. 
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After sorting out the variables that are used as life stage predictors, the following few steps were 
involved, in order to reach a final classification: 
 Calculate each predictor for every firm year in the sample; 
 
 For each firm year, compute a five years mean of each of the predictors15; 
 
 Rank each firm year according to each predictor mean, and group them into three quantiles.  
 
 Give a partial score, ranging from 1 to 3, to each predictor mean, in accordance with the 
quantile occupied. 
 
 Calculate a final composite score, given by the sum of the partial scores. Considering the 
lowest and highest scores in all three descriptors we know that the composite score can 
fluctuate between 3 and 9. 
 
 Finally, assign a firm life stage based on the composite score, as shown in Table 7. 
 
While the organizational life cycle theory is widely accepted, some researchers16 still discuss whether its 
applicability is limited, sustaining their criticism on an eventual lack of support for a sequential 
progression between stages. In fact, already in the middle 60s, Gardner (1965) was sympathetic with 
this issue, when he writes that “organizations differ from people and plants in that their cycle isn’t even 
approximately predictable. An organization may go from youth to old age in two or three decades, or it 
may last for centuries. More important, it may go through a period of stagnation and then revive”. 
(Gardner, 1965, p.16) 
 
That is one serious pitfall in which univariate (i.e. by age) classifications can easily incur. However, the 
multivariate system described earlier, does not solely constrain the maturity stages to time, thereby 
accomplishing two goals. First, regarding the problem of linear assignment of stages, where a mature 
                                                          
15
 This step enforces that each firm in the sample contains at least 6 years of consecutive data, prior to each firm year. 
16
 i.e., Churchill & Lewis (1983), Scott & Bruce (1987), O’Farrell & Hitchens (1988), Kazanjian & Drazin (1989), McMahon (2001), Lester et al. (2003), 
Massey et al. (2006) and Levie & Lichtenstein (2010). 
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or even stagnant stage can precede a growth stage, as long as that particular firm observation displays 
other growth characteristics (i.e. high sales, low dividends). Secondly, the use of multiple variables 
should mirror more precisely the various changes that firms endure at each stage, increasing the 
reliability of the process. 
 
To summarize, measuring and assigning stages of maturities is a complex task prone to errors of 
various sorts. Nevertheless, we find the methodology adopted especially flexible and adequate for its 
purpose.  
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4 - Sample and Data 
 
All the accounting information was obtained from the international data bases – Datastream and 
Worldscope. The initial dataset, comprising data for firms from 31 industrial subsectors17 and all 49 
countries18 listed in La Porta et al (1997), for the broadest period available (12 years), was properly 
standardized19.  
 
To ensure data validity and integrity, numerous sanitizing procedures and rules were applied. All non-
industrial firms (i.e., financials, and regulated utilities) as well as firm repetitions20 were automatically 
discarded. Other factors that could compromise the inclusion of a given firm included the occurrences 
of invalid and/ or insufficient data to compute the necessary summary variables, listed in appendix A, 
or the variables used to separate firms into different stages of maturity. 
    
After completing the elimination process, all variables are winsorized at 5% to mitigate the adverse 
effects of outliers and the final sample is left with 12,235 firms and 56,420 valid firm observations 
between 1996 and 2007. While the date of 1996 imposed itself because of technical limitations (not 
enough data and/or firms for previous years), the date of 2007 was deliberately chosen to avoid a well-
known period of world economic crisis that could lead to incorrect results21.  
 
Also, because it’s not uncommon to find that similar studies often end with different results, only 
because of plain sample diversity22 and the use of different data structures23, all the 56,420 firm 
observations are rearranged into different data panels and groups as shown in Figure 1. This way, 
following a similar intuition as La Porta et al (1997), instead of extracting a single USA sample, the 
observations are also sorted by country into two additional logical groups – Common Law and Civil 
Law. Withal, two types of data panels are created – Balanced and Unbalanced. Table 1 and Table 2 
provide an insight about the countries comprising each sample. 
 
                                                          
17
 Following standard practice, all the sectors known to operate under special regulations are excluded (i.e., Financials, regulated utilities). 
18
 Except Uruguay which no longer seems to be part of the data base. 
19
 All the information was converted to 2007 dollars and deflated using the appropriate ICP (index consumer price). 
20
 Firms with various stock emissions will be double listed in the worldscope data base. 
21
 As far as this paper is concerned, crises are exceptions, not the rule. Sporadic events, that place firms under exceptional conditions of financial distress. 
This fact alone, could seriously compromise the performance of both capital structure models. 
22
 Studies conducted in different countries. 
23
 Balanced or unbalanced data panels. This is important because balanced panels lead to problems of survivorship bias, where only firms that exist for 
the full period are included. 
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Finally, due to insufficient firm observations in the balanced samples, only unbalanced samples are 
further refined into three distinct stages of the organizational life cycle namely, growth, maturity and 
stagnancy. 
 
In the end, a total of 15 samples, that should help better understand just how randomly the trade-off 
and pecking order models, described in Section 3, perform under different scenarios, and more 
importantly, with firms in different stages of maturity. 
 
 
4.1 - Characterist ics of Samples 
 
Opting for balanced panels in detriment of unbalanced ones has important repercussions. By definition, 
a balanced panel imposes that a firm cannot have any year gap during the whole observation period. In 
Table 3, we can see that this constraint alone causes both a significant reduction in the number of 
observations, and a slight skew in the composition of the samples, at the industry level24. More 
precisely, enforcing this rule diminishes the exposure of the samples to firms in sectors generally 
associated with growth opportunities (i.e., technology, healthcare).  
 
Additional peculiarities of the balanced samples are highlighted in Table 5. Taking the USA samples (1) 
and (4) for instance, we realize that firms contained in the balanced panel (1) are, in average, older 
(Age), bigger (Size) and more profitable (ROA) than firms in the unbalanced panel (4). Also, the first, 
tend to pay more dividends (Dividends), display higher tangibility (Tang.) and experience lower sales 
growth (Δ Sales) than the second. Overall, the same is true for the common and civil law samples (2 
and 5; 3 and 6) suggesting that the balanced panels are biased towards older firms. Also, commonly 
used proxies for growth opportunities including the market to book (MB) and the retained earnings ratio 
(RE/TA)25, show that while balanced panels are mainly composed of older firms, they’re not necessarily 
in a more mature stage (usually characterized by slower growth) since they exhibit similar MB ratios as 
the unbalanced samples. 
 
                                                          
24
 Omitted chi-square goodness of fit tests, show that all the balanced and unbalanced samples, as well as the respective subsamples, are composed by 
significantly different percentages of industries (at 1% level). 
25
 According to DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz (2006), firms in a capital infusion stage will show a lower RE/TA ratio, while a high ratio will often be a sign 
for more mature firms. 
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Turning our attention to unbalanced panels, if we contrast the unbalanced samples in Table 3 with 
their respective growth, mature and stagnant subsamples in Table 4, we can evaluate just how effective 
the classification procedure was from an industry point of view. Consistently, the composition of all 
growth subsamples shift towards Technological and Health sectors, while for mature subsamples the 
opposite happens, and industries like Services & Goods, Retail, and Construction & Material, move up 
in the pyramid. Concurrently, in the stagnant subsamples, we can observe how many of the top 5 
industrial sectors present in the growth subsamples give place to sectors as Chemicals, Basic 
Resources, Media, and so on. Altogether, this configuration foreshadows an optimistic classification of 
firms by stages of maturity that propagates to Table 5, where all the variables contemplated by the 
organizational life cycle hypothesis (i.e. Age, Size, Δ Sales, MB, Dividends, etc.), behave as one would 
expect. 
 
Further analysis of Table 5 shows that the most significant net equity issues are carried out by growth 
firms. Reporting equivalent findings, Fama & French (2002) and Frank & Goyal (2003), argue that from 
a pecking order perspective, this may pose a conundrum. They reason that, in contrast to mature firms 
which benefit from an increased diversification as well as a better reputation in debt markets, high-
growth firms, usually undergo higher information asymmetry costs. Therefore, one would expect that 
firms of this nature would follow more diligently a theory that rests on the idea that, adverse selection 
problems are the engine empowering firms’ financial decisions – pecking order- which does not occur 
in their results. 
 
Despite compromising the strict pecking order theory, another story tells, according to Lemmon & 
Zender (2010), that equity issues by high-growth firms are in fact contemplated by the weak-form of the 
pecking order theory. Not only that, but they also point out why high-growth firms may not be subject to 
higher asymmetry costs than their mature counterparts. One interpretation posits that the higher 
asymmetry regarding its assets in place is in reality overshadowed by the superior value of their growth 
opportunities. Additionally, they claim that the reduced debt capacity of smaller firms attenuates the 
negativity that is usually signaled together with the announcement of an equity issue, when investors 
realize their lack of financial alternatives.  
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Moving on to the book leverage, it does not seem to follow any clear pattern. In fact, with the exception 
of the USA samples, it’s not even statistically different26 between most stages of maturity and when it is, 
the values are still very similar. A plausible reason could be the conflicting relation between leverage 
and the organizational life cycle hypothesis. As we discussed earlier, according to the organizational life 
cycle hypothesis, as firms evolve from younger to more mature stages, growth opportunities (MB) tend 
to decrease while profitability (ROA) increases and vice-versa. However, together with other proxies, MB 
and ROA are also part of a well-documented set of variables that are correlated with leverage. In 
particular, according to Rajan & Zingales (1995), Fama & French (2002) and Frank & Goyal (2009) 
leverage is negatively related to both. A relation for which we also provide evidence in Table 11, where 
after a common leverage regression, we find negative statically significant coefficients between leverage 
and both ROA and MB. In practice, this means that at any given stage they will be exerting opposite 
effects on leverage, explaining the homogenization present in Table 5. 
 
One puzzle where the negative relation between ROA and leverage fails to fit is the trade-off theory, and 
could anticipate an overall inadequate fit of the trade-off as a valid capital structure theory to our 
samples. All the same, it’s worth mentioning that this already poses an early hindrance to the optimum 
capital structure theory. 
  
                                                          
26
 For this purpose, the appropriate mean difference t-tests were performed. 
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5 - Results 
 
In this section we discuss how the trade-off and pecking order models perform with our set of samples. 
Note that, even though tables present variables scaled by total assets, alternative scales were tested 
(net assets, sales, total debt + market equity) attaining similar results. Similarly, alternative non-
reported dependent variables included the use of total debt, besides the long term debt. Also, common 
econometric disturbances as heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation are not left to 
chance. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests are performed and standard 
errors have been corrected accordingly. Finally, intending to control for firms specific uniqueness’s we 
conduct both a (OLS) fixed and a (GLS) random effects analysis. Considering that subsequent 
Hausman tests27 account for significant differences between the two approaches, only the fixed effects 
estimations (simultaneously controlling for firm and time - year-) are reported. 
 
 
5.1 - Trade-off Theory 
 
The results for the trade-off and pecking order models are conveniently separated into different tables. 
Starting with the trade-off in Table 8, ΔLD denotes the dependent variable (Variation of long term debt 
ratio) and Target deviation 1 and Target deviation 2, two substitute definitions for the independent 
variable (target debt ratio deviation). As in Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999), they are historic debt ratio 
means, but while the first is a five-year rolling average, the second is an average for the full period by 
which a firm enters the sample. A third specification regarding an industry average of debt ratios was 
also tested but, like Target deviation 1, although statistically significant, proved to be a weak proxy, with 
low adjustment coefficients and poor predictability. Target deviation 2, on the other hand, provides 
moderate support for the trade-off theory, with much better results where the adjusting coefficients and 
R2 are as high as 0.523 and 28,6% (unbalanced common law sample). These results are in line with 
the ones presented by Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999).  
 
                                                          
27
 Wooldridge (2002) explains that “since FE is consistent when ci and Xit are correlated, but RE is inconsistent, a statistically significant difference is 
interpreted as evidence against the random effects assumption.” 
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A quick comparison of results, both within and between panels, indicates that the trade-off performs 
considerably better with our set of unbalanced samples where the adjustment factors and predictability 
are factored by a 50% increase. Take for instance, the balanced Common Law sample (β=0.346, 
R2=21.8%) and the unbalanced Common Law one (β=0.523, R2=28.6%). Moreover, one should note 
that the adjustment coefficients in the balanced samples range from β=0.323 to β=0.370 while in the 
unbalanced samples from β=0.471 to β=0.523. Clearly, there is a more substantial variance in 
coefficients between samples of different data panels. This is a strong indication that firm specific 
characteristics (i.e. age, size, market-to-book, tangibility, etc.) play a major role in the financial 
decisions as opposed to other exogenous factors (geographically related). Particularly in this case, the 
trade-off shows a certain affinity to firms that show characteristics often recognized in younger firms 
(unbalanced samples).  
 
In Table 9, we have our unbalanced samples (USA, Common Law and Civil Law) split into different 
maturity stages. This time, the variable Target deviation 1 was foregone in consequence of its poor 
results during previous tests. Our results show, that the trade-off model exhibits a consistent tendency 
throughout all the samples used. Coherent with our previous findings, where the trade-off performance 
was slightly better with the unbalanced samples (more exposed to younger firms), also here, we see 
that the coefficients are constantly higher for firms in growth stages and degrade nearly 14%, on 
average, as we progress to mature stages.  
 
At stagnancy, there are some obvious differences, however. While the USA and Common Law samples, 
show similar coefficients for firms in the mature and stagnant stages, the Civil Law stagnant subsample 
stands out with a strikingly high coefficient, matching the ones observed only in growth firms. 
 
Performing a similar analysis on Table 10, now using interaction variables for the maturity stages, as 
well as additional control variables (size, tang, roa and mb) to better isolate the effect of Target 
deviation 2, we find that the adjustment coefficients remain highly significant in all stages. Also, the 
generalized tendency continues to be characterized by a statistically significant degeneration of the 
trade-off results as we advance past growth stages, common to all the samples but the Common Law, 
where the coefficients linger around β=0.560. Overall, with coefficients oscillating between β=0.410 
and β=0.579, our results reasonably seem to support the idea that firm’s leverage is mean reverting, 
at least, partially. 
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To further assess the degree of the adjustment we also present Table 12, Table 13 and Table 14, 
where Flannery & Rangan’s (2006) framework is used. Table 12 shows that the correlation indexes 
between variables range from -0.414 to 0.450, confidently alleviating any concerns about 
multicollinearity. In Table 13, we perform 3 different estimations. 
 
As Flannery & Rangan (2006) mention in their work, the correlation between the independent variable 
LMLR (lagged market leverage ratio) and unobservables relegated to the error term, generates a 
problem of endogeneity, which in turn leads to overestimated adjustment coefficients (columns 1, 3 
and 7). A method to deal with unobserved effects involves using fixed effects estimators (within 
regressions) that tend to perform well when the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. However, 
due to endogeneity, this approach is also unfeasible and will often result in a downward bias of the 
estimates (columns 2, 4 and 8). Essentially, this means that the true adjustment speeds will be 
somewhere in between the estimates of the GLS (random effects) and OLS (fixed effects) regressions. 
 
One solution to mitigate the problem of omitted variables bias and finding the true estimates consists in 
using instrumental variables. Thus, we conduct a two-stage least squares regression (columns 3, 5 and 
9) where the lagged book leverage ratio (LBLR), calculated as total debt to book value of assets, is used 
as an instrument for the lagged market leverage ratio (LMLR). LBLR displays a correlation of 89% with 
LMLR in the USA and Common Law samples, and 90.14% in the Civil Law sample (Table 12). 
 
As expected, the new estimates for LMLR land between the ones computed previously. In Table 13, we 
report statistically significant adjustment speeds of 54.3% for the USA, 52.3% for the Common Law and 
50.4% for the Civil law samples. Despite the similitude of coefficients, these results also show some 
degree of consistency with the view that legal environments that benefit from stronger investor 
protections as well as more developed capital markets, contribute to raise the willingness to exchange 
funds for securities (La Porta et al., 1997). This could explain why firms in the USA adjust their capital 
structure 3.9% faster than firms in Civil Law countries. 
 
Moreover, in Table 14, we find that growth firms adjust faster than mature or stagnant firms. In fact, 
the Common Law and Civil Law growth samples adjust approximately 13% faster than the mature ones, 
displaying adjustment speeds as high as 64.5% (Common Law). Curiously, while the USA growth 
33 
 
samples display a slower adjustment speed of 60.7%, the mature USA firms, adjust 6-7% faster when 
compared to the Common Law or Civil Law counterparts. 
 
Summing up the trade-off evidence provided so far, we believe that, despite some theoretical 
inconsistencies, this theory remains a strong contestant, empirically. Also, through the lens of the 
organizational life cycle hypothesis, we can confidently argue that firms financing decisions are not 
stage invariant either in amount or speed. 
 
 
5.2 - Pecking Order Theory 
 
Regarding the pecking order in Table 15, ΔLD is used as the dependent variable (variation of long term 
debt) and Deficit 1 and Deficit 2 as explanatory variables, representing the financial needs of a given 
firm. Here, Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999) propose that the Deficit 2 is computed as the sum of 
dividends paid, capital expenditures, current portion of long term debt and increase in working capital, 
minus the net cash flow from operating activities. Frank & Goyal (2003) disagree, alleging that the 
current portion of long term debt does not belong in the equation and thus outlined Deficit 1, where 
CPLT (current portion of long term debt) is left out. Further illustrating Frank & Goyal’s (2003) critique, 
all columns in Table 16 show that ΔLD and CPLTD are inversely related (negative coefficients), 
meaning that any increase in the current portion of long term debt, leads to a decrease in long term 
debt issues, which contradicts the logic behind Deficit(2). Also, contrasting both approaches, Deficit 1 
does provide, uniformly, slightly better results for all the samples. Nevertheless, despite the best effort, 
the coefficients achieved in our tests, using these two methods, are far less supportive of the pecking 
order than the ones presented in Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999), with only β=0.373 and R2=27.3% 
(balance civil law). 
 
In Table 17, resorting to Fama & French (2005) accounting identity we defined Deficit 3 as  the sum of 
the change in stockholder’s equity and the change in total liabilities, that proved to be a clear 
improvement over Deficit 1 and Deficit 2, especially concerning the predictability of the model. This 
time, while we found a similar β=0.398, the proportion of variance in the amount of debt issued, that 
can be explained by the Deficit3, doubled to 51.6% (balanced civil law). Despite the improvement, 
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support for the pecking order theory, is still dubious since, for every unit increase in the deficit only 
19.7% to 39.8% is issued as debt, evidencing that equity is still a common choice among firms. The 
magnitude of these findings jeopardizes the arguments behind the pecking order, even if we consider 
the weak-form of this theory. This interpretation is transversally true for all the samples. The pecking 
order seems to explain the Civil law samples more accurately when compared to the USA or Common 
law samples but, the coefficients are disturbingly lower than expected by the theory. Also, returning to 
Table 11, and running a second leverage regression (columns 2 5 and 8), where we add the Deficit 3 
as an explanation variable, does not wipe the effect of other conventional variables. In fact, it’s only 
statistically significant in the Common Law leverage regression and the impact is rather residual, 
meaning that while not insignificant, for itself, cannot explain leverage.  
 
An interesting contrast with the previous theory is how the pecking order describes more closely our 
panels of balanced samples (containing older firms) as opposed to the unbalanced ones. Furthermore, 
while the coefficients of the balanced samples continue to display a certain similitude, the same does 
not happen with the unbalanced samples, where they oscillate between β=0.197 and β=0.337.  
 
Switching over to Table 18, this erratic behavior becomes slightly corrected and a thin trend starts to 
emerge among the growth and mature stages. Although less evident in the Civil Law subsamples, the 
coefficients still improve over the life cycle of the firm. Control variables added later, in Table 19, do not 
seem to disturb the previous results considering that, the USA and Common Law samples continue to 
display statistically superior (although still poor) coefficients at mature stages. Apparently evading this 
trend, the Civil Law results are found to be rather similar between all the maturity stages, possibly 
highlighting firm’s difficulties to shorten the gap of information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, even at later stages, which in this case, could be aggravated by the weaker investor’s 
protection and unsophisticated markets, inherent to civil law legal systems. These largely disappointing 
results of the pecking order could also suggest that the proxies used to factor in the different 
organizational life cycle stages, are not tightly related to the performance of the pecking order model. 
 
To answer this question and understand what factors are really driving the pecking order results, we 
follow a more conventional route and desegregate the organizational life cycle stage predictions by 
grouping the 56,420 firm observations into three quantiles, one variable at a time, until all the variables 
described in Table 5 are used. Then, we re-ran the pecking order tests for all the groups, in order to 
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pinpoint which variables produced, simultaneously, the worst and best results in the first and third 
quantiles or vice-versa. In this manner, we are able to evaluate how the pecking order model reacts 
when exposed to each individual aspect, namely age (Age), size (Size), dividends paid (Dividends), 
change in sales (Δ Sales), capital expenditures (Capex), tangibility (Tang), tobin’s q (Tobq), profitability 
(ROA), change in assets (Δ Assets), Market to book (MB) and retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA). 
 
After trying each factor individually as well as several combinations of proxies28, we realize that our 
suspicions were right and the proxies used to map the different life cycle stages are not the most 
critical regarding the pecking order’s model performance. The most pertinent results are condensed in 
Table 20  where we find that a classification by tangibility (Tang) and size (Size) simultaneously, 
influence the pecking order tests the most, with special relevance for tangibility alone. It’s worth noting 
that, after retesting the pecking order model with this new configuration, the coefficients seem to be 
much more uniform across different samples, performing increasingly better for firms with higher 
tangibility and size (Q3). But do these findings make any sense regarding the pecking order theory? 
 
Actually, these results could help shed some light on why the pecking order seems to break down, 
especially when high-growth firms are included. To a firm, tangible assets can be described as those 
which have a physical form. To an investor, tangibility means collateral. If we assume that the pecking 
order premises are correct, while a firm would prefer to consume debt before equity, in reality, debt, 
either in the form of loans or bonds, can be blocked and collateral could be decisive to unlock that 
door.  
 
Banks, in essence, are extremely risk averse, generally conducting thorough due diligence, demanding 
high collateral and putting firms under strict covenants, before any loan is conceded. Bonds on the 
other hand, are more flexible but tapping the bond market for the first time also poses some 
challenges. For a successful issue, a firm would need to be rated by a credible agency and already 
familiar to the investors base. In such a context, the financing behavior of younger firms may be 
explained by need instead of choice. Odds are that this kind of firms lack sufficient internal resources to 
finance their accelerated growth. Investors are not acquainted with them, and banks will often 
recognize that their tangible assets -collateral- is insufficient to accommodate the risk in which they 
                                                          
28
 The combination of multiple proxies was achieved using a compound score similar to the one described in section 3. For each factor, an additional 
variable was created containing the index of the quantile occupied by each firm observation. Summing these individual indexes, allows the ranking of firm 
observations into new quantiles, taking into account multiple variables. 
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incur. Altogether, could limit their debt capacity, increasing the cost of leverage beyond desirable and 
pushing them towards stock issues. This kind of reasoning falls well within the pecking order (weak 
form) predictions. 
 
All things considered, our findings about the pecking are unclear at the best. Therefore, we advise 
some moderation in the interpretation of the evidence provided, especially because there are other 
factors that must be taken into account. It’s true that, overall, we achieved considerably lower 
coefficients with this model but, it is also true that, unfortunately, Shyan-Sunder & Myers’ (1999) 
model, does not have enough power to answer the most important question regarding this theory, 
which is not if firms issue more or less equity to finance their deficits, but in which conditions. Whether 
the deficit slopes are close to one, or far below, the model does not provide unequivocal proof of the 
pecking order validity (Chirinko & Singha, 2000). 
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6 - Conclusion 
 
In the spirit of Shyan-Sunder & Myers’ (1999), during the course of this study, we tested how the 
dominant capital theories, trade-off and pecking order, perform with samples on different stages of the 
organizational life cycle hypothesis. 
 
In short, we find that, on multiple international broad samples over the period of 1996 to 2007, growth 
firms issue more equity, while leverage is similar across different stages of maturity.  
 
Under the argument of limited debt capacity, the first finding is not incompatible with the pecking 
order, but the empirical connection between deficit and leverage seems to be questionable when 
compared to alternative common variables, including the market-to-book, profitability, size and 
tangibility. In turn, the second finding, together with the negative relation between profitability and 
leverage, haunts the trade-off, but favors the pecking order. 
 
It’s clear that both theories have their shortcomings. Notwithstanding, as an overall theory, the trade-off 
performs considerably better than the pecking order in our set of samples. Despite displaying 
adjustment coefficients that are still somewhat lower than expected, they can be made sense of, if we 
consider the existence of significant adjustment costs, which makes the choice of continuously 
correcting the deviation from the target leverage, suboptimal. Despite this fact, all firms seem to adjust 
rather quickly. The trade-off also performs better with growth firms, which, comparatively, also display 
the fastest adjustment speeds, while the pecking order does not seem to show any meaningful 
connection with any stage of maturity. Although the pecking order performs slightly better with older 
firms, further testing shows that the pecking order model is particularly sensitive to firms proxied by 
tangibility and size. 
 
Compiling all the evidenced discussed, the inverse performance of the trade-off and pecking order 
models suggest that, as firms become more mature, the paradigm of their financial decisions shifts in 
some degree. While it seems consistent that firms follow a certain capital structure during the course of 
their existence (overall better performance of the trade-off model), it is also clear that, as they mature, 
they may become increasingly more permissive and tolerant to deviations from that target (reduced 
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performance of the trade-off model towards mature stages), supporting the theory of a life cycle of 
financing decisions. 
 
As we see it, the immense potential of young firms is usually accompanied by a similar amount of risk 
that pushes away the most conservative lenders. As a result, firm’s financing choices are narrowed to 
equity and perhaps, very limited amounts of feasible debt. This lack of choices (which also includes a 
clear shortage on internal resources), along with the interest to build and maintain a good reputation 
(to eventually unlock currently constrained financing alternatives, and preserve them in the future), may 
serve as financial governance mechanisms that restrain firms’ capital structure within a fairly strict 
configuration, as suggested by the trade-off, but not inconsistent with the pecking order. 
 
Down the road, as firms overcome the initial headwinds, building up in size, profitability and tangible 
assets (collateral), they reduce their external dependences and conquer the interest of past, desired, 
but inaccessible investors. At this point, they should be able to willingly switch equity for cheaper 
internal resources and debt, possibly explaining both why their capital structure becomes less rigid 
(more financing options become available), as suggested by the decreasing performance of the trade-
off model, at later stages, and why the pecking order model results improve in mature stages and firms 
with such characteristics (high size and tangibility). 
 
As a last note, we’d like to remind that, our tests are not indisputable. As far as Shyan-Sunder & Myers’ 
(1999) framework goes, the trade-off proved to be a superior contestant however, the possibility of 
false positives and false negatives regarding the pecking order model, is a possibility that should not be 
understated. 
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Figure 1- This diagram shows how firm observations were grouped into different 15 samples. This distribution of samples allows us to know three things. First, if we should expect different 
results depending on the data structure chosen. Second, if we should expect that the results hold beyond the USA scope. For last but not least, if the tested capital structure models do exhibit 
some degree of connection with the organization life cycle hypothesis.  
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Table 1 – This table shows the constitution 
of the balanced data samples in terms of 
observations by country. 
Samples /Countries N % Total 
 
USA 2,796 100% 
 
COMMON LAW 1,224 100% 
MALAYSIA 288 23.53% 
CANADA 252 20.59% 
SINGAPORE 228 18.63% 
THAILAND 204 16.67% 
HONG KONG 120 9.80% 
UNITED KINGDOM 84 6.86% 
SOUTH AFRICA 24 1.96% 
AUSTRALIA 12 0.98% 
NEW ZEALAND 12 0.98% 
 
CIVIL LAW 1,056 100% 
CHILE 168 15.91% 
INDONESIA 144 13.64% 
NETHERLANDS 132 12.50% 
DENMARK 120 11.36% 
TAIWAN 120 11.36% 
MEXICO 72 6.82% 
FINLAND 60 5.68% 
FRANCE 60 5.68% 
BELGIUM 48 4.55% 
ITALY 48 4.55% 
SWITZERLAND 24 2.27% 
AUSTRIA 12 1.14% 
JAPAN 12 1.14% 
NORWAY 12 1.14% 
PERU 12 1.14% 
SWEDEN 12 1.14% 
 
 
Table 2 – This table shows the constitution 
of the unbalanced data samples in terms 
of observations by country. 
Samples /Countries N % Total 
 
USA 21,073 100% 
 
COMMON LAW 18,051 100% 
UNITED KINGDOM 3908 21.65% 
MALAYSIA 2709 15.01% 
HONG KONG 1992 11.04% 
CANADA 1980 10.97% 
SINGAPORE 1634 9.05% 
AUSTRALIA 1556 8.62% 
THAILAND 1500 8.31% 
INDIA 1116 6.18% 
SOUTH AFRICA 716 3.97% 
PAKISTAN 269 1.49% 
NEW ZEALAND 229 1.27% 
IRELAND 200 1.11% 
ISRAEL 191 1.06% 
SRI LANKA 51 0.28% 
 
 
CIVIL LAW 17,296 100% 
JAPAN 5631 32.56% 
TAIWAN 2209 12.77% 
FRANCE 1718 9.93% 
INDONESIA 1023 5.91% 
GERMANY 644 3.72% 
SWITZERLAND 610 3.53% 
MEXICO 579 3.35% 
NETHERLANDS 579 3.35% 
DENMARK 567 3.28% 
CHILE 543 3.14% 
SWEDEN 489 2.83% 
ITALY 472 2.73% 
FINLAND 417 2.41% 
NORWAY 387 2.24% 
BELGIUM 301 1.74% 
GREECE 171 0.99% 
PERU 171 0.99% 
TURKEY 162 0.94% 
ARGENTINA 136 0.79% 
AUSTRIA 97 0.56% 
SPAIN 96 0.56% 
COLOMBIA 95 0.55% 
VENEZUELA 67 0.39% 
BRAZIL 62 0.36% 
PORTUGAL 35 0.20% 
EGYPT 28 0.16% 
JORDAN 7 0.04% 
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Table 3 – This table shows the top 5 industrial sectors that compose each control sample. Between brackets is the sample index also used in Figure 1. With the intent to evaluate if the 
samples are statistically different at the industry level, a chi-square goodness of fit test was performed revealing that all the balanced and unbalanced samples are statistically different at 1% 
level.  
Balanced Panels Unbalanced Panels 
 
(1) USA, N=2,796 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 19.31% 
Technology 18.03% 
Healthcare 13.73% 
Retail 12.45% 
Oil & Gas 6.87% 
 
 
(4) USA, N=21,073 
 
Technology 21.58% 
Ind. Goods & Services 20.01% 
Healthcare 16.35% 
Retail 8.48% 
Pers & Househld Goods 6.80% 
   
 
(2) Common Law,  N=1,224 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 22.55% 
Food & Beverage 18.63% 
Travel & Leisure 10.78% 
Construct. & Material 9.80% 
Media 6.86% 
 
 
(5) Common Law, N=18,051 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 22.00% 
Technology 9.97% 
Pers & Househld Goods 9.61% 
Food & Beverage 8.43% 
Construct. & Material l 7.87% 
   
 
(3) Civil Law, N=1,056 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 21.59% 
Construct. & Material 11.36% 
Food & Beverage 11.36% 
Technology 10.23% 
Pers & Househld Goods 9.09% 
 
 
(6) Civil Law, N=17,296 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 22.84% 
Technology 12.95% 
Pers & Househld Goods 9.92% 
Construct. & Material 8.77% 
Retail 7.53% 
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Table 4 - This table shows the top 5 industrial sectors that compose each subsample after proper classification into different stages of maturity, using the procedure described in chapter 3. 
Between brackets is the sample index also used in Figure 1. With the intent to evaluate if the samples are statistically different at the industry level, a chi-square goodness of fit test was 
performed revealing that all the subsamples are statistically different at 1% level.  
 Unbalanced Panels 
USA 
 
(7) Growth, N=10,206 
 
Technology 23.34% 
Healthcare 21.55% 
Ind. Goods & Services 17.52% 
Retail 8.13% 
Oil & Gas 7.00% 
   
 
(8) Mature, N=10,037 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 21.93% 
Technology 20.96% 
Healthcare 12.17% 
Retail 8.62% 
Pers & Househld Goods 7.89% 
   
 
(9) Stagnant, N=830 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 25.86% 
Pers & Househld Goods 12.76% 
Retail 10.17% 
Chemicals 9.66% 
Media 7.07% 
   
Common 
Law 
 
(10) Growth, N=5,911 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 21,02% 
Technology 15,00% 
Basic Resources 8,96% 
Healthcare 8,84% 
Oil & Gas 8,03% 
   
 
(11) Mature, N=10,977 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 22,62% 
Pers & Househld Goods 11,63% 
Food & Beverage 9,85% 
Construct. & Material 8,43% 
Technology 7,88% 
   
 
(12) Stagnant, N=1,163 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 21,03% 
Food & Beverage 13,39% 
Pers & Househld Goods 11,16% 
Travel & Leisure 9,53% 
Retail 8,15% 
   
Civil Law 
 
(13) Growth, N=4,879 
 
Technology 21.77% 
Ind. Goods & Services 20.29% 
Retail 7.67% 
Healthcare 7.52% 
Pers & Househld Goods 7.44% 
   
 
(14) Mature, N=10,490 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 23.56% 
Pers & Househld Goods 11.11% 
Technology 10.50% 
Construct. & Material 9.79% 
Food & Beverage 7.26% 
   
 
(15) Stagnant, N=1,927 
 
Ind. Goods & Services 25.38% 
Construct. & Material 13.91% 
Pers & Househld Goods 9.70% 
Retail 9.29% 
Food & Beverage 7.99% 
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Table 5 - This table shows the summary statistics for all the samples used. Further details on the variables are presented in the last table. Between brackets is the sample index also used in 
Figure 1. 
Summary 
variables 
(Means) 
1996 – 2007 
Balanced panel data  Unbalanced panel data 
United 
States 
Commo
n Law 
Civil 
Law 
 United States  Common Law  Civil Law 
All 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
All 
(3) 
 
All 
(4) 
Growth 
(7) 
Mature 
(8) 
Stag. 
(9) 
 
All 
(5) 
Growth 
(10) 
Mature 
(11) 
Stag. 
(12) 
 
All 
(6) 
Growth 
(13) 
Mature 
(14) 
Stag. 
(15) 
Age 15.281* 14.471* 14.159*  9.890 7.748* 11.421 17.729  9.799 7.571* 10.251 16.852  11.702 8.121* 12.325 17.377 
Size 13.733* 13.119* 13.760*  12.345 12.239* 12.358 13.495  12.095 11.955* 12.088 12.868  13.072 12.764* 13.122 13.577 
Dividends 
p. 
0.107* 0.354* 0.403*  0.061 0.002* 0.082 0.547  0.301 0.079* 0.369 0.783  0.294 0.082* 0.325 0.662 
Δ Sales 0.119* 0.072* 0.077  0.183 0.338* 0.040 0.019  0.150 0.329* 0.070 -0.009  0.082 0.197* 0.047 -0.017 
Capex 0.059* 0.054 0.053*  0.051 0.053* 0.048 0.052  0.052 0.058* 0.050 0.051  0.047 0.052* 0.046 0.041 
Net debt 
iss. 
0.012 0.002** 0.002  0.009 0.014* 0.004 0.004  0.006 0.013* 0.003 0.002  -0.001 0.007* -0.004 -0.009 
Net equity 
iss. 
0.030* 0.003* 0.008  0.003 0.017* -0.010 -0.004  0.015 0.033* 0.008 -0.012  0.009 0.027* 0.005 -0.013 
Tang. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.304* 0.427* 0.386*  0.248 0.229* 0.259 0.333  0.355 0.329* 0.366 0.383  0.325 0.299* 0.335 0.338 
Tobin’s q 2.056 1.257* 1.269*  2.031 2.280* 1.807 1.688  1.412 1.559* 1.340 1.339  1.325 1.522* 1.278 1.079 
ROA 0.045* 0.043* 0.042*  -0.022 -0.033* -0.017 0.050  0.029 0.017* 0.033 0.050  0.032 0.036* 0.033 0.022 
Δ Assets 0.061* 0.004* 0.023  0.028 0.063* -0.005 0.002  0.037 0.084* 0.019 -0.021  0.018 0.065* 0.006 -0.035 
MB/A 1.802 1.034* 1.012**  1.782 2.047* 1.543 1.416  1.158 1.302* 1.088 1.085  1.050 1.256* 1.002 0.787 
BLeverage 0.457* 0.483* 0.542*  0.439 0.419* 0.456 0.485  0.468 0.468 0.471 0.441  0.505 0.508 0.506 0.494 
RE/TA 0.036* 0.021* 0.023*  -0.026 -0.032* -0.023 0.020  0.006 0.004 0.007 0.009  0.017 0.025* 0.016 0.006 
N (obs.) 2,796 1,224 1,056  21,073 10,206 10,037 830  18,051 5,911 10,977 1,163  17,296 4,879 10,490 1,927 
 
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, mean difference ttest performed between Growth and Mature (marked in the growth subsamples), All balanced and All unbalanced (marked in the balanced samples).
49 
 
Table 6 – This table shows the expected behavior of each lifecycle predictor used by Anthony & Ramesh (1992) to infer the different stages of the organizational lifecycle. Initially, there were 
four variables, Age, ΔSales, Capital expenditures and Dividends paid, however, seeing that at the industry level, some biases towards sectors with high capital expenditures29 were happening 
when classifying growth firms, like Anthony & Ramesh(1992) we decided to drop capital expenditures as a classification variable. For each firm year, each remaining variable is calculated for 
the prior consecutive 5 years and the median is selected. Unlike Anthony & Ramesh(1992), I chose to use the mean instead30. Then for each year, firms are sorted into three quantiles and 
given a score that ranges from 1 to 3, according to the quantil occupied. The previous procedure is repeated for all three variables. Lastly, the individual scores are combined to form the final 
compound score and assign a lifecycle stage as shown in Table 3. 
Lifecycle predictors 
Organizational Lifecycle stages 
Growth Maturity Stagnation 
Age ( - ) ( +/- ) ( + ) 
ΔSales ( + ) ( +/- ) ( - ) 
Capital expenditures ( + ) ( +/- ) ( - ) 
Dividends paid ( - ) ( +/- ) ( - ) 
 
Table 7 – This table shows how organizational life stages are assigned according to a firm compound score they obtained during the classification process. 
Compound Score Organizational Lifecycle stages 
3 ≤ X < 5 Growth stage 
5 ≤ X < 8 Mature stage 
8 ≤ X < 10 Stagnant stage 
                                                          
29
 Some sectors may show higher levels of capital expenditures compared to others and not all the firms in those sectors are necessarily in growth stages. 
30
 For instance, if we want to classify a firm year observation (ie, year 2000) and we consider the following range of historic values  {0,9%, 0,7%, 0,8%, 1.5%, 2,2%} for ΔSales, the median will be 0,9%, which was recorded 5 years ago, and is 
clearly very different from what the company is registering nowadays. A simple mean does not fully solve this problem since it ignores the order in which events happened, but it does produce some improvements over the median during the 
classification process. A more robust alternative would be using a weighted mean where recent years would have more weight, but that would require determining the correct weight to give to each year. 
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Table 8 - This table presents the Trade-Off model’s results for the control samples (without controlling for life cycle stages). Full balanced and unbalanced panel samples are used for a total 
period length of 12 years (1996-2007). ΔLD symbolizes the dependent variable (variation of long term debt ratio). Target deviation 1(2) is calculated as the difference between the target debt 
1(2) ratio and the debt ratio of the prior year. It is important to keep in mind that the target debt is unobservable, for that reason several proxies were constructed. For parsimony’s sake only 
two definitions of Target Debt are presented below (those which yielded better results) where: Target debt 1 is defined as an historic rolling mean (prior 5 years leverage ratios) for each firm 
year. Alternatively, Target debt 2 represents the 12 years’ leverage mean for each firm. All variables are deflated, winsorized at 5% and scaled by book assets. Also, other common scales were 
tested (net assets, sales, total debt + market equity) but no relevant qualitative changes were observed. 
TRADE-OFF MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Balanced panel data (no gaps) Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law United States Common Law Civil Law 
ΔLD 
(1) 
ΔLD 
(2) 
ΔLD 
(3) 
ΔLD 
(4) 
ΔLD 
(5) 
ΔLD 
(6) 
OLS
a
 
Constant 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
Target deviation 
1 
0.198*** 
(0.042) 
0.261*** 
(0.037) 
0.241*** 
(0.037) 
0.345*** 
(0.019) 
0.386*** 
(0.021) 
0.371*** 
(0.033) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.054 0.092 0.076 0.106 0.129 0.122 
Constant 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Target deviation 
2 
0.323*** 
(0.028) 
0.346*** 
(0.039) 
0.370*** 
(0.045) 
0.471*** 
(0.029) 
0.523*** 
(0.029) 
0.506*** 
(0.033) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.189 0.218 0.227 0.250 0.286 0.280 
 N (obs.) 2,796 1,224 1,056 21,073 18,051 17,296 
 
*** 
p<0.01,
 ** 
p<0.05,
 * 
p<0.1
 
a 
Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly. 
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Table 9 – Because results with Target deviation 1 and Target deviation 2 yield a similar conclusion, this table synthetizes results where they are more evident - Target deviation 2. Also, Shyan-
Sunder & Myers (1999) found that Target deviation 1 appeared to be a weaker definition for target debt, where his results were not statically significant. ΔLD symbolizes the dependent variable 
(variation of long term debt ratio). Target deviation 2 is calculated as the difference between the target debt 2 ratio and the debt ratio of the prior year. Target debt 2 represents the 12 years’ 
leverage mean for each firm. All variables are deflated, winsorized at 5% and scaled by book assets. Also, other common scales were tested (net assets, sales, total debt + market equity) but 
no relevant qualitative changes were observed. 
TRADE-OFF MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law 
Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage 
ΔLD 
(1) 
ΔLD 
(2) 
ΔLD 
(3) 
ΔLD 
(4) 
ΔLD 
(5) 
ΔLD 
(6) 
ΔLD 
(7) 
ΔLD 
(8) 
ΔLD 
(9) 
OLS
a
 
Constant 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
Target deviation 2 
0.558*** 
(0.021) 
0.485*** 
(0.029) 
0.480*** 
(0.058) 
0.614*** 
(0.027) 
0.534*** 
(0.028) 
0.507*** 
(0.033) 
0.601*** 
(0.018) 
0.510*** 
(0.041) 
0.593*** 
(0.049) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.303 0.255 0.282 0.336 0.295 0.262 0.339 0.276 0.346 
 N (obs.) 10,206 10,037 830 5,911 10,977 1,163 4,879 10,490 1,927 
 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
* 
p<0.1 
a
 Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly. 
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Table 10 – ΔLD symbolizes the dependent variable (variation of long term debt ratio). Target deviation 2 is calculated as the difference between the target debt 2 ratio and the debt ratio of the 
prior year. Target debt 2 represents the 12 years’ leverage mean for each firm. MaturexTarget deviation 2 and StagnantxTarget deviation 2 are interaction variables for the mature and stagnant 
stages. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Tang is defined as the fixed assets to total assets. Mb is the market to book ratio, given by the market value of assets to book value of 
assets. Roa is computed as net earnings to total assets. All variables are deflated, winsorized at 5% and scaled by total assets. 
TRADE-OFF MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law 
ΔLD 
(1) 
ΔLD 
(2) 
ΔLD 
(3) 
OLS
a
 
Target deviation 2 
0.520*** 
(0.0178) 
0.560*** 
(0.0285) 
0.579*** 
(0.0183) 
MatureXTarget deviation 2 
-0.0556** 
(0.0241) 
-0.0140 
(0.0308) 
-0.0547** 
(0.0215) 
StagnantXTarget deviation 2 
-0.110** 
(0.0402) 
-0.0746 
(0.0416) 
-0.0318 
(0.0462) 
Size 
0.0238*** 
(0.00105) 
0.0221*** 
(0.00112) 
0.0249*** 
(0.00141) 
Tang 
0.0904*** 
(0.00601) 
0.0710*** 
(0.00578) 
0.0690*** 
(0.00501) 
Roa 
-0.0953*** 
(0.00860) 
-0.112*** 
(0.00419) 
-0.221*** 
(0.0118) 
Mb 
-0.00444*** 
(0.000526) 
0.00106 
(0.00115) 
0.00280 
(0.00170) 
Fixed Effects yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.296  0.338 
 N (obs.) 21,073 18,051 17296 
 
*** 
p<0.01, 
** 
p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1 
a
 Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly
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Table 11 - This table presents a leverage regression for all the unbalanced samples with conventional variables defined as follows. MLR represents the market leverage ratio. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets. Tang is defined as the fixed assets to total assets. Mb is the market to book ratio, given by the market value of assets to book value of assets. Roa is computed as 
net earnings to total assets. Deficit 3, defined as in Fama & French (2005), was computed summing the changes in stockholder’s equity and total liabilities, also scaled by total assets. 
LEVERAGE 
1996 - 2007 
Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law 
MLR  
 (1) 
MLR  
 (2) 
MLR  
 (3) 
MLR  
 (4) 
MLR  
(5) 
MLR  
(6) 
OLS
a
 
Constant 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.022* 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.019) 
0.057*** 
(0.016) 
0.057*** 
(0.016) 
Size 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
Tang 
0.200*** 
(0.016) 
0.200*** 
(0.016) 
0.192*** 
(0.010) 
0.191*** 
(0.010) 
0.283*** 
(0.021) 
0.282*** 
(0.020) 
Roa 
-0.118*** 
(0.020) 
-0.124*** 
(0.021) 
-0.421*** 
(0.045) 
-0.408*** 
(0.042) 
-0.987*** 
(0.076) 
-0.986*** 
(0.067) 
Mb 
-0.050*** 
(0.004) 
-0.051*** 
(0.004) 
-0.085*** 
(0.002) 
-0.080*** 
(0.002) 
-0.062*** 
(0.004) 
-0.062*** 
(0.004) 
Deficit 3 - 
0.021 
(0.015) 
- 
-0.046** 
(0.018) 
- 
-0.004 
(0.041) 
Fixed Effects No No No No No No 
R2 0.316 0.317 0.319 0.320 0.361 0.361 
 N (obs.) 21,073 21,073 18,051 18,051 17,296 17,296 
 
***
 p<0.01,
 **
 p<0.05,
 *
 p<0.1 
a
 Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly
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Table 12 - This table shows the degree of correlation between the variables used in the leverage regressions. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Tang is defined as the fixed assets 
to total assets. Mb is the market to book ratio, given by the market value of assets to book value of assets. Roa is computed as net earnings to total assets. LMLR is the one year lagged market 
leverage ratio, given by the ratio between total debt and the sum of total assets minus the book value of equity with the market value of equity. Finally, LBLR stands for the lagged book leverage 
ratio, calculated as total debt to book value of assets. 
LEVERAGE 
1996 - 2007  
Unbalanced United States (with gaps)  
Size Tang Roa Mb LMDR LBLR 
CORR 
Size 1.000 - - - - - 
Tang 0.210 1.000 - - - - 
Roa 0.376 0.133 1.000 - - - 
Mb -0.083 -0.165 0.017 1.000 - - 
LMLR 0.172 0.351 0.013 -0.414 1.000 - 
 LBLR 0.248 0.352 0.047 -0.279 0.890 1.000 
 
Unbalanced Common Law (with gaps)  
Size Tang Roa Mb LMDR LBLR 
CORR 
Size 1.000 - - - - - 
Tang 0.207 1.000 - - - - 
Roa 0.243 0.025 1.000 - - - 
Mb -0.033 -0.148 0.190 1.000 - - 
LMLR 0.172 0.319 -0.174 -0.397 1.000 - 
 LBLR 0.258 0.308 -0.112 -0.207 0.890 1.000 
 
Unbalanced Civil Law (with gaps)  
Size Tang Roa Mb LMDR LBLR 
CORR 
Size 1.000 - - - - - 
Tang 0.140 1.000 - - - - 
Roa 0.101 -0.047 1.000 - - - 
Mb -0.002 -0.122 0.450 1.000 - - 
LMLR 0.112 0.377 -0.360 -0.366 1.000 - 
 LBLR 0.175 0.346 -0.260 -0.153 0.9014 1.000 
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Table 13 - This table presents a leverage regression for all the unbalanced samples with conventional variables defined as follows: MLR represents the market leverage ratio, given by the ratio 
between total debt and the sum of total assets minus the book value of equity with the market value of equity. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Tang is defined as the fixed 
assets to total assets. Mb is the market to book ratio, given by the market value of assets to book value of assets. Roa is computed as net earnings to total assets. LMLR is the one year lagged 
MLR. Finally, LBLR stands for the lagged book leverage ratio, calculated as total debt to book value of assets. LBLR is used as instrumental variable in the two-stage least squares regression in 
columns 3, 6 and 9. 
LEVERAGE 
1996 - 2007 
Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law 
MLR  
GLS (1) 
MLR  
 OLS (2) 
MLR  
 2SLS (3) 
MLR  
 GLS (4) 
MLR  
 OLS (5) 
MLR  
 2SLS (6) 
MLR  
 GLS (7) 
MLR  
 OLS (8) 
MLR  
 2SLS (9) 
GLS, 
OLS, 
2SLS
a
 
Constant 
-0.029** 
(0.010) 
-0.294*** 
(0.026) 
- 
-0.018* 
(0.009) 
-0.327*** 
(0.045) 
- 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.454*** 
(0.037) 
- 
Size 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.031*** 
(0.002) 
0.031*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.037*** 
(0.004) 
0.037*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.003) 
0.047*** 
(0.002) 
Tang 
0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.132*** 
(0.011) 
0.128*** 
(0.009) 
0.039*** 
(0.006) 
0.154*** 
(0.012) 
0.148*** 
(0.007) 
0.043*** 
(0.009) 
0.130*** 
(0.013) 
0.118*** 
(0.009) 
Roa 
-0.073*** 
(0.008) 
-0.114*** 
(0.008) 
-0.111*** 
(0.005) 
-0.182*** 
(0.022) 
-0.275*** 
(0.015) 
-0.268*** 
(0.010) 
-0.340*** 
(0.032) 
-0.529*** 
(0.026) 
-0.504*** 
(0.014) 
Mb 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.022*** 
(0.001) 
-0.022*** 
(0.001) 
-0.022*** 
(0.001) 
-0.045*** 
(0.001) 
-0.043*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.061*** 
(0.004) 
-0.058*** 
(0.002) 
LMLR 
0.799*** 
(0.016) 
0.420*** 
(0.040) 
0.457*** 
(0.008) 
0.800*** 
(0.009) 
0.429*** 
(0.021) 
0.477*** 
(0.008) 
0.817*** 
(0.011) 
0.432*** 
(0.034) 
0.496*** 
(0.008) 
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.774 - 0.345 0.798 - 0.406 0.834 - 0.506 
 N (obs.) 21,073 21,073 20,389 18,051 18,051 17,290 17,296 17,296 16,737 
 
***
 p<0.01,
 **
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1 
a 
Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly
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Table 14 - This table presents a leverage regression for all the subsamples in different maturity stages with conventional variables defined as follows: MLR represents the market leverage ratio, 
given by the ratio between total debt and the sum of total assets minus the book value of equity with the market value of equity. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Tang is defined 
as the fixed assets to total assets. Mb is the market to book ratio, given by the market value of assets to book value of assets. Roa is computed as net earnings to total assets. Finally, LBLR 
stands for the book leverage ratio, calculated as total debt to book value of assets, is used as instrumental variable in the two-stage least squares regression in columns  1 to 9. 
LEVERAGE 
1996 - 2007 
Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law 
Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage 
MLR  
 (1) 
MLR  
 (2) 
MLR  
 (3) 
MLR  
 (4) 
MLR  
 (5) 
MLR  
 (6) 
MLR  
 (7) 
MLR  
 (8) 
MLR  
 (9) 
2SLS 
Constant - - - - - - - - - 
Size 
0.026*** 
(0.002) 
0.039*** 
(0.002) 
0.067*** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
0.040*** 
(0.002) 
0.061*** 
(0.009) 
0.038*** 
(0.003) 
0.055*** 
(0.002) 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
Tang 
0.106*** 
(0.014) 
0.155*** 
(0.013) 
0.031 
(0.048) 
0.200*** 
(0.015) 
0.150*** 
(0.010) 
0.112*** 
(0.026) 
0.144*** 
(0.021) 
0.091*** 
(0.012) 
0.111*** 
(0.029) 
Roa 
-0.109*** 
(0.008) 
-0.112*** 
(0.008) 
-0.380*** 
(0.052) 
-0.218*** 
(0.017) 
-0.283*** 
(0.014) 
-0.290*** 
(0.045) 
-0.506*** 
(0.029) 
-0.535*** 
(0.019) 
-0.416*** 
(0.047) 
Mb 
-0.021*** 
(0.001) 
-0.027*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.047*** 
(0.003) 
-0.045*** 
(0.002) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.065*** 
(0.003) 
-0.062*** 
(0.002) 
-0.058*** 
(0.006) 
LMLR 
0.393*** 
(0.013) 
0.426*** 
(0.012) 
0.447*** 
(0.040) 
0.355*** 
(0.018) 
0.487*** 
(0.011) 
0.516*** 
(0.036) 
0.366*** 
(0.018) 
0.500*** 
(0.010) 
0.470*** 
(0.027) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.292 0.338 0.429 0.336 0.405 0.384 0.430 0.523 0.458 
 N (obs.) 9,444 9,386 760 5,020 10,252 1,036 4,294 9,907 1,761 
 
***
 p<0.01,
 **
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1 
a 
Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly
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Table 15 - This table presents the Pecking order model’s results for the control sample (without controlling for life cycle stages). Full balanced and unbalanced panel samples are used for a 
total period length of 12 years (1996-2007). ΔLD symbolizes the dependent variable (long term debt variation). Deficit 1 is defined as dividends paid + capital expenditures + Δ working capital 
– net cash flow from operating activities. Alternatively, Deficit 2 is the same as Deficit 1plus current portion of long term debt as in Shyan-Sunder & Myers (1999). All variables are deflated, 
winsorized at 5% and scaled by total assets. Also, other common scales were tested (net assets, sales, total debt + market equity) but no relevant qualitative changes were observed. 
PECKING ORDER MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Balanced panel data (no gaps) Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law United States Common Law Civil Law 
ΔLD 
(1) 
ΔLD 
(2) 
ΔLD 
(3) 
ΔLD 
(4) 
ΔLD 
(5) 
ΔLD 
(6) 
OLS
a
 
Constant 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
Deficit 1 
0.254*** 
(0.009) 
0.263*** 
(0.024) 
0.373*** 
(0.024) 
0.183*** 
(0.014) 
0.200*** 
(0.014) 
0.294*** 
(0.013) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.126 0.190 0.273 0.106 0.134 0.213 
Constant 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Deficit 2 
0.221*** 
(0.015) 
0.205*** 
(0.026) 
0.322*** 
(0.018) 
0.157*** 
(0.015) 
0.164*** 
(0.012) 
0.237*** 
(0.009) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.100 0.138 0.215 0.080 0.097 0.143 
 N (obs.) 2,796 1,224 1,056 21,073 18,051 17,296 
 
*** 
p<0.01,
 ** 
p<0.05,
 *
 p<0.1 
a
 Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional correlation and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected 
accordingly.
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Table 16 – This table shows the results for the pecking order, when using the dissociated components of Deficit 2 as independent variables. DP represent the dividends paid, CAPEX, the 
capital expenditures, ΔWC, the change in working capital, CPLTD, the current portion in long term debt, and finally NOCF, are the net operating cash flows. All variables are deflated, 
winsorized at 5% and scaled by total assets. 
PECKING ORDER MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Balanced panel data (no gaps) Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law United States Common Law Civil Law 
ΔLD 
(1) 
ΔLD 
(2) 
ΔLD 
(3) 
ΔLD 
(4) 
ΔLD 
(5) 
ΔLD 
(6) 
OLS
a
 
Constant 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
DP 
0.612** 
(0.210) 
0.102 
(0.083) 
0.186** 
(0.070) 
0.316*** 
(0.082) 
-0.000 
(0.037) 
0.182*** 
(0.036) 
CAPEX 
0.359*** 
(0.048) 
0.595*** 
(0.058) 
0.584*** 
(0.061) 
0.351*** 
(0.029) 
0.410*** 
(0.019) 
0.457*** 
(0.029) 
ΔWC 
0.169*** 
(0.018) 
0.276*** 
(0.036) 
0.331*** 
(0.026) 
0.138*** 
(0.016) 
0.188*** 
(0.015) 
0.252*** 
(0.013) 
CPLTD 
-0.543*** 
(0.105) 
-0.165*** 
(0.038) 
-0.330*** 
(0.104) 
-0.470*** 
(0.032) 
-0.235*** 
(0.015) 
-0.425*** 
(0.023) 
NOCF 
-0.322*** 
(0.023) 
-0.168*** 
(0.019) 
-0.254*** 
(0.022) 
-0.184*** 
(0.015) 
-0.158*** 
(0.009) 
-0.194*** 
(0.015) 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R
2
 0.139 0.213 0.270 0.116 0.154 0.235 
 N (obs.) 2,796 1,224 1,056 21,073 18,051 17,296 
 
***
 p<0.01
, **
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1 
a 
Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly. 
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Table 17 - This table presents the Pecking order model’s results for the control sample (without controlling for life cycle stages). Ful l balanced and unbalanced panel samples are used for a 
total period length of 12 years (1996-2007). ΔLD symbolizes the dependent variable (long term debt variation). Deficit 3, defined as in Fama and French (2005), was computed summing the 
changes in stockholder’s equity and total liabilities. All variables are deflated, winsorized at 5% and scaled by total assets. Also, other common scales were tested (net assets, sales, total debt + 
market equity) but no relevant qualitative changes were observed. 
PECKING ORDER MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Balanced panel data (no gaps) Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law United States Common Law Civil Law 
ΔLD 
(1) 
ΔLD 
(2) 
ΔLD 
(3) 
ΔLD 
(4) 
ΔLD 
(5) 
ΔLD 
(6) 
OLS
a
 
Constant 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Deficit 3 
0.325*** 
(0.013) 
0.322*** 
(0.013) 
0.398*** 
(0.013) 
0.197*** 
(0.018) 
0.237*** 
(0.006) 
0.337*** 
(0.009) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.358 0.445 0.516 0.227 0.313 0.416 
 N (obs.) 2,796 1,224 1,056 21,073 18,051 17,296 
 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05,
 *
 p<0.1 
a
 Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly.
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Table 18 – Since Deficit 2 wasn’t properly specified, it was dropped. Also since Deficit 3 yielded better results we drop Deficit 1. Therefore, we chose to report only the results obtained with 
Deficit 3. ΔLD symbolizes the dependent variable (long term debt variation). Deficit 3, defined as in Fama & French (2005), was computed summing the changes in stockholder’s equity and 
total liabilities. All variables are deflated, winsorized at 5% and scaled by total assets. 
PECKING ORDER MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law 
Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage Growth stage Mature stage Stag. stage 
ΔLD 
(1) 
ΔLD 
(2) 
ΔLD 
(3) 
ΔLD 
(4) 
ΔLD 
(5) 
ΔLD 
(6) 
ΔLD 
(7) 
ΔLD 
(8) 
ΔLD 
(9) 
OLS
a
 
Constant 
0.001** 
(0.004) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
Deficit 3 
0.186*** 
(0.016) 
0.219*** 
(0.019) 
0.340*** 
(0.022) 
0.212*** 
(0.012) 
0.256*** 
(0.005) 
0.243*** 
(0.012) 
0.337*** 
(0.016) 
0.343*** 
(0.007) 
0.332*** 
(0.013) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.211 0.258 0.433 0.273 0.340 0.323 0.401 0.425 0.398 
 N (obs.) 10,206 10,037 830 5,911 10,977 1,163 4,879 10,490 1,927 
 
*** 
p<0.01, 
** 
p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1 
a
 Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly 
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Table 19 – Since Deficit 2 wasn’t properly specified, it was dropped. Also since Deficit 3 yielded better results we drop Deficit 1. Therefore, we chose to report only the results obtained with 
Deficit 3. ΔLD symbolizes the dependent variable (long term debt variation). Deficit 3, defined as in Fama & French (2005), was computed summing the changes in stockholder’s equity and 
total liabilities. MaturexDeficit 3 and StagnantxDeficit 3 are interaction variables for the mature and stagnant stages. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Tang is defined as the fixed 
assets to total assets. Mb is the market to book ratio, given by the market value of assets to book value of assets. Roa is computed as net earnings to total assets. All variables are deflated, 
winsorized at 5% and scaled by total assets. 
PECKING ORDER MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law 
ΔLD 
(1) 
ΔLD 
(2) 
ΔLD 
(3) 
OLS
a
 
Deficit 3 
0.192*** 
(0.018) 
0.217*** 
(0.015) 
0.341*** 
(0.016) 
MatureXDeficit 3 
0.019** 
(0.006) 
0.035** 
(0.015) 
-0.000 
(0.010) 
StagnantXDeficit 3 
0.153*** 
(0.029) 
0.0246 
(0.023) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
Size 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Tang 
0.064*** 
(0.011) 
0.047*** 
(0.003) 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
Roa 
-0.040*** 
(0.007) 
-0.034** 
(0.011) 
-0.080*** 
(0.007) 
Mb 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Fixed Effects yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.243 0.321 0.421 
 N (obs.) 21,073 18,051 17296 
 
*** 
p<0.01, 
** 
p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1 
a
 Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly
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Table 20 – This table shows the pecking order test results for all the unbalanced samples when sorted into terciles, according to tangibility and size, simultaneously. Q1 to Q3 represents the 
different quantiles. ΔLD symbolizes the dependent variable (long term debt variation). Deficit 3, defined as in Fama & French (2005), was computed summing the changes in stockholder’s 
equity and total liabilities. Q2xDeficit 3 and Q3xDeficit 3 are interaction variables for the second and third terciles. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Tang is defined as the fixed 
assets to total assets. Mb is the market to book ratio, given by the market value of assets to book value of assets. Roa is computed as net earnings to total assets. All variables are deflated, 
winsorized at 5% and scaled by total assets.  
PECKING ORDER MODEL 
1996 - 2007 
Unbalanced panel data (with gaps) 
United States Common Law Civil Law 
ΔLD 
(Q1) 
 
ΔLD 
(Q2) 
ΔLD 
(Q3) 
OLS
a
 
Deficit 3 
0.101*** 
(0.010) 
0.128*** 
(0.007) 
0.241*** 
(0.010) 
Q2XDeficit 3 
0.188*** 
(0.005) 
0.165*** 
(0.021) 
0.132*** 
(0.011) 
Q3XDeficit 3 
0.360*** 
(0.011) 
0.251*** 
(0.014) 
0.199*** 
(0.017) 
Size 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.049*** 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Tang 
0.077*** 
(0.009) 
0.049*** 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
Roa 
-0.036*** 
(0.007) 
-0.035*** 
(0.010) 
-0.081*** 
(0.007) 
Mb 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.035 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.320 0.369 0.442 
 N (obs.) 21,073 18,051 17,296 
 
***
 p<0.01,
 **
 p<0.05,
 *
 p<0.1 
a
 Heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation disturbances were taken into consideration. For that purpose, White, Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests were performed and standard errors have been corrected accordingly.
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Appendix A 
List of Variables 
 
Age: Difference between the firm observation year and the year in which the firm entered the data 
base. Source: Lemmon & Zender (2010). 
Size: Natural logarithm of total assets. Source: Fama & French (2002). 
Dividends: Five years mean of the ratio between dividends paid and income before extraordinary items. 
Source: Anthony & Ramesh (1992). 
Δ Sales: Five years mean of the change in sales or revenues. Source: Anthony & Ramesh (1992). 
Capex: Capital expenditures to total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
Net Debt: Change in the book value of total debt. Source: Hovakimian, Hovakimian, & Tehranian, 
(2004). 
Net Equity: Difference between the change in the book value of equity and the change in retained 
earnings: Source: Fama & French (2005). 
Tang: Fixed assets given by Net property plant and equipment to total assets: Source: Frank & Goyal 
(2003). 
Tobin’s q: Ratio between the total assets minus the book value of equity plus market capitalization and 
total assets. Source: Compustat. 
ROA: Ratio between earnings and book value of assets. Source: Fama & French (2002). 
Δ Assets: Asset growth as the percentage change in total assets. Source: Cooper, Gulen, & Schill 
(2008). 
MB: Market value of assets to book value of assets. Source: Fama & French (2005). 
BLeverage: Book value of the liabilities to total assets. Source: Compustat. 
RE/Ta: Retained earnings to total assets. Source: DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz (2006). 
